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social science. 1 Whatever naturalism is, it should be something that interpretivists would reject. Thus, formulating naturalism in terms of some very general standards of good evidence is problematic, since many interpretivists would accept such standards, too.
In addition, Kincaid's criteria of independent, fair, and cross testing are not sufficiently specific to engage with discussions of other methodological problems in social science, such as causal inference from observational data. Consider an example of social science research that Kincaid regards as exemplifying the virtues of independent, fair, and cross tests: Jeffery Paige's (1975) classic Agrarian Revolution. According to Kincaid,
Paige's theory of agrarian movements certainly seems to have the traits of good science. It exhibits the evidential virtues of summarized by independent, fair, and cross tests. (1996, p. 78; italics in original) Paige proposes a theory about which types of agrarian social structures produce which types of conflict between cultivators and non-cultivators. Among the several hypotheses that comprise this theory, I consider the just one that can be represented in the graph in figure 1. The variable ML indicates the presence or absence of an agrarian system in which landlords' income is based predominantly on land ownership (rather than commercial or industrial capital) and in which landlords rely on migrant labor. The variable RN indicates the presence or absence of revolutionary movements among migrant laborers that appeal to nationalism as a basis of solidarity. Thus, the hypothesis is that the presence of such an agrarian system is a cause of nationalist revolutionary movements. Paige's presents two lines of statistical evidence for this hypothesis (cf. 1975, pp. 104-8) . First, there is a positive, statistically significant correlation between ML and RN.
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Figure 1: Migrant labor and revolutionary nationalism.
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Figure 2: An alternative hypothesis.
Secondly, Paige argues that this correlation cannot be accounted for by the alternative hypothesis represented in figure 2. In this graph, C is a variable indicating the presence absence of a colonial regime. Paige's argument against this alternative is that a model in which ML and C influence RN interactively fits the data better than one in which they influence it additively (1975, p. 108) . Moreover, in the interactive model, there is no statistically significant correlation between C alone and RN, although there is a significant correlation between RN and the interaction term for C and ML (ibid. p. 109).
Thus, Paige concludes that since C and ML interact to cause RN, the alternative represented in figure 2 cannot be correct.
Although Paige's study may be a case of independent, fair, and cross testing, there are active debates in social science and philosophy about whether the sorts of methods he employs can in fact justify causal conclusions. Paige considers just two alternatives, and argues that the one in which ML is a cause of RN fits the data best. Yet this result does not eliminate other models that include further variables and in which ML is not a cause of RN. Suppose that Paige had pursued this possibility, and had drawn up a reasonably comprehensive list of potential common causes of ML and RN. Then he would have been confronted with the problem that increasing the number of variables rapidly generates a combinatorial explosion in the number of alternative models. It is a difficult question to what extent there are methods capable of reliably drawing informative causal conclusions in the face of such a vast array of alternatives.
2 The point here is definitely not to suggest that Paige's work is substandard: to the contrary, I agree with Kincaid that it is an example careful and conscientious social science. The issue concerns the adequacy of methods available to social scientists for learning causes and effects of social phenomena.
And Kincaid's criteria of independent, fair, and cross tests simply do not engage with this issue.
The same point can be made with regard to methodological disputes concerning methods of causal inference used in econometrics. Such methods typically assume that one begins with some qualitative knowledge of the causal structure (say, on the basis of micro-economic theory). The inference problem then consists of providing quantitative estimates of causal impacts. A common objection to such methods is that they rely upon modeling assumptions whose accuracy is generally difficult to ascertain (cf. LaLonde 1986). Assumptions are made about such things as the functional form of the relationships between causes and effect, the probability distribution of the error terms, and whether the error terms are independent. Since the accuracy of such assumptions is often quite uncertain, it is often difficult to assess which model one should choose. A response to such objections is that specification tests can be performed to assess whether the assumptions in the model are accurate (cf. Heckman and Hotz 1989 ). An example of such a test monitors matched groups for some time prior to the implementation of the program to see if any significant differences in outcomes emerge. If not, the model passes the specification test. The utilization of specification tests presumably entail that the inference methods in question satisfy Kincaid's criteria of fair and independent testing. That is, the tests do not presuppose the accuracy of any particular hypothesis concerning quantitative causal effects, and the specification tests provide some independent basis for the assumptions upon which the test is premised. However, some object that such specification tests themselves depend upon questionable assumptions 3 and are not always effective in weeding out models that generate inaccurate estimates (Friedlander and Robins 1995) . Moreover, some studies find that sophisticated statistical methods intended to produce balanced comparison groups are often ineffective at reducing bias, sometimes significantly increase it (Michalopoulos, Bloom, and Hill 2004) , and did far less to reduce bias than simply selecting the comparison group from an adjacent locality (ibid; Friedlander and Robins 1995) .
In sum, many interpretivists would accept Kincaid's criteria of independent, fair, and cross testing, and those standards do little to address other methodological disputes in social science. Hence, showing that social science research is sometimes in accord with these criteria is not a strong argument for naturalism. On the other hand, attempting to refute naturalism on the grounds that it fails to live up to very specific standards of natural science faces the objection that these more specific rules do not hold for all natural sciences either. For example, critiques of naturalism often maintain that certain features of human beings make it impossible for there to be universal laws of society.
4
Yet a defender of naturalism can respond to this by pointing out that some natural sciences (e.g. molecular biology) do not discover, nor even seem to attempt to discover, universal laws of nature. 5 For example, several authors have argued that explanations in many biological sciences are based primarily on mechanisms rather than laws (cf.
Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Glennan 2005; Craver 2007 Bhaskar (2000 Bhaskar ( [1979 ) also associates naturalism with the Enlightenment. 8 See Rothschild (2001) and Schabas (2005) for excellent discussions of the economic and social theories of these and other Enlightenment figures. 9 For example, Popper explicitly associates this "piecemeal tinkering" approach to social reform with the naturalist approach to social science (2002 [1957] , chapter III).
is the conviction that social science can deliver generalizable knowledge that can serve as a basis for improving society.
It is easy to see how the Enlightenment ideal, if combined with the implicit presumption of a strong thesis concerning the unity of scientific method, would lead directly to the formulation of naturalism described in the previous section. Given a strong thesis concerning the unity of scientific method, a straightforward way to pursue the Enlightenment ideal of social science would be to identify the scientific discipline that has achieved the greatest success and attempt to emulate its methods. think that a defense of naturalism in the philosophy of social science simply cannot sidestep the question of the connection between values and method. Moreover, these two issues-causal inference and the connection between values and methods-correspond directly to two central lines of criticism of naturalist approaches to social science. In the following two sections, I consider these issues in turn.
Interpretation and Causation
I argued above that acceptance of basic standards of good evidence is not a feature that distinguishes interpretivists from naturalists. An advantage of formulating the dispute in terms of the Enlightenment ideal, then, is that it highlights issues about which naturalists and interpretivists actually do diverge. One such issue concerns the ability of social science to discover generalizable causal relationships. Traditional defenses of naturalism tend to frame this issue as the question of whether there are laws of social science that resemble laws in natural sciences such as physics. In this section, I argue that this traditional manner of defending naturalism rests on an implicit assumption of a strong thesis of the unity of scientific method and tends to obscure the pertinent issues concerning causal inference and generalization. I explain how construing naturalism in terms of the Enlightenment ideal of social science results in a better formulation of this issue.
A perennial topic in Anglo-American philosophy of social science in the latter half of the twentieth century was whether explanations of human action are inherently non-causal (Winch 1958; Taylor 1971; Davidson 1980; Henderson 1993 Reflecting on the interpretive turn in social science that he helped launch, Geertz refers to "the growing recognition that the established approach to treating [cultural] phenomena, laws-and-causes social physics, was not producing the triumphs of prediction, control, and testability that had for so long been promised in its name" (1983, p. 3 concerns the notion of "deep play" mentioned so prominently in the title of his article.
What Geertz proposes is a pair of causal hypothesis. The first concerns factors that make a cockfight deep rather than shallow and uninteresting, while the second is a claim about the effects of deep fights upon Balinese observers and participants.
The "deepness" of a match has to do with the level of excitement it generates, which is normally expressed by the quantity of money wagered on it. According to Geertz, a typical fight would involve two sorts of bet: the center bet and side bets (1973, . The center bet is contracted between the two men whose roosters are to engage in mortal combat, and this bet is always made at even money odds. Side bets are made among the spectators and are contracted at odds ranging from ten-to-nine to two-to-one. would be one way to answer the charge that knowledge of causes of social phenomena cannot be generalized from one context to another. And it is irrelevant to that project whether mechanisms and causal effects can be lumped into some category of "cp law" along with fundamental laws of physics.
In sum, framing the naturalism debate in terms of the Enlightenment ideal highlights one of the central issues that divides interpretivists from naturalists, namely, the extent to which general causal knowledge is attainable in social science. Although defenses of naturalism formulated in the traditional manner do address this issue, they do so in a way that focuses attention on tangential questions that reflect an implicit assumption of a strong thesis of the unity of scientific method and a regard for physics as the paradigm science. In particular, these discussions assume that general causal claims in social science must resemble those in physics, an assumption that leads directly to the emphasis on cp laws. But if no such strong thesis of the unity of scientific method is presupposed, then a focus on cp laws is neither necessary nor even helpful. It is not necessary, since there is no reason to suppose that the methods best suited for social science must be substantially the same as those in physics. And it is unhelpful in that the emphasis on cp laws tends to conceal the diverse array of methods and causal claims available to social scientists. In short, it matters crucially to the Enlightenment ideal that it is possible for social science to acquire general causal knowledge, but not whether social science does this in a way that fits some supposed ideal model of physical science.
The Betterment of Society
There is a long running dispute in philosophy of science as to whether scientific research can be insulated from social, moral, and political values and indeed whether it is even a good idea to try to do so (cf. Harding 1986 Harding , 1998 Kitcher 2001; Longino 1990 Longino , 2002 Nagel 1961) . The classic defense of naturalism argues that non-epistemic values can, at least in principle, be excluded social science research and that every effort should be made to keep them apart in practice (Kincaid 1996, pp. 45-46; Nagel 1961, chapter 13; Papineau 1978) . Arguments for this position typically appeal to some form of the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification. According to this line of reasoning, while non-epistemic values may come into play in the process of choosing research topics and constructing hypotheses or theories (the context of discovery), they
are not relevant to questions about whether or not those hypotheses or theories are supported by the evidence (the context of justification). However, the context-ofdiscovery-versus-justification distinction has come under a considerable degree of criticism in the philosophy of science literature within the past twenty to thirty years. In this section, I suggest that one significant advantage of construing naturalism in terms of the Enlightenment ideal is that it frees naturalism from the context-of-discovery-versusjustification dichotomy. I also sketch some ways the issue of non-epistemic values in social science research can be more fruitfully addressed from a naturalist perspective.
While the traditional defense of naturalism seeks to isolate social science from all social values, my formulation of the issue explicitly emphasizes the link between social science and a commitment to social improvement. At the heart of the Enlightenment ideal is the thesis that social science should discover knowledge that will contribute to the betterment of society. Given this perspective, it would be strange indeed to insist that social science must be strictly isolated from social values, since without some connection of that kind social science would be an enterprise with no purpose. Thus, if naturalism is understood in terms of the Enlightenment ideal, there should be no temptation to sweep social values under the rug with a dubious context-of-discovery-versus-justification broom. Instead, the connection between social science and social values would have to be confronted squarely.
One difficulty with the context-of-discovery-versus-justification distinction is that there are now several works explicitly aimed at providing an account of the logic of scientific discovery (cf. Langley et al. 1987; Kelly 1996, chapter 9) , as well as case studies examining the logic of the discovery process in specific scientific domains (cf. Darden and Craver 2002) . Thus, it is doubtful that discovery, in contrast to justification, is some ineffably intuitive process. To the contrary, the two seem symmetrical: both are amenable to logical analysis and in practice both can be influenced by social and political values. But perhaps the most significant problem with the context-of-discovery-versusjustification distinction for the present purposes is that it would not be sufficient to sequester scientific results from social values even if it were granted. As Kathleen
Okruhlik ( (Harding 2003 (Harding , 2005 Scientific communities will be objective to the degree that they satisfy four criteria necessary for achieving the transformative dimension of critical discourse:
(1) there must be recognized avenues for the criticism of evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reasoning; (2) there must exist shared standards that critics can invoke; (3) the community as a whole must be responsive to such criticism; (4) intellectual authority must be shared equally among qualified practitioners. (1990, p. 76) Longino's thought is that epistemic communities that satisfies the above four 
Conclusion
The dispute concerning naturalism in the philosophy of social science has traditionally been posed in terms of the question of whether social science can and must follow the standards of the natural sciences. I have argued that this formulation of the issue is problematic in that it presumes an overly strong thesis about the unity of scientific method. Social science often fails to satisfy specific rules and standards of particular natural sciences, but the same is also true among distinct natural sciences themselves.
And basic standards of good evidence that apply to all natural sciences are likely to be accepted by critics of naturalism. In light of this, I propose that naturalism be understood in reference to the Enlightenment ideal of a science of society that would discover causes and effects of social phenomena capable of supporting rational social policies. This formulation of the issue is preferable for several reasons. It highlights the issues about which naturalists and their critics actually disagree, and it frames those issues in a manner that avoids digressions on such topics as whether social science has laws that resemble those of physics. Moreover, it links disputes about naturalism to lively controversies elsewhere in the philosophy of science literature, such as social epistemology. Finally, I
think that framing naturalism in terms of the Enlightenment ideal redirects the debate back to the important issues that motivated it in the first place.
